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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Jackson appeals from the District Court's entry of Judgment of Convictions for Battery
on a Law Enforcement Officer, a felony, and for Resisting, Obstructing or Delaying an Officer, a
misdemeanor.

Course of Proceedings
Mr. Jackson was charged by way oflnformation for Battery Against a Police officer, a felony
in violation ofldaho Code §18-915(3 )(b) and Resisting and Obstructing, a misdemeanor, in violation
ofldaho Code § 18-705. Mr. Jackson pleaded not guilty to the charges and a jury trial was held on
February 14 -15 of 2019. The jury found the Defendant Guilty of both Counts. ®. p. 117). A
Judgment of Conviction Order of Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation was filed on June
26, 2019. ( R. p. 127). Mr. Jackson timely filed a Notice of Appeal on July 22, 2019. ( R. p. 144).

Statement of the Facts
On June 12, 2018, Idaho County Deputies Keith Olson and Hernandez responded to a call
of a vehicle crash that occuned in Kamiah, Lewis County, Idaho. (Tr. p. 124, Ls. 22-23; P. 126 Ls.

1- p. 127 L. 1.) Upon aITiving, Officer Olson contacted both drivers involved in the accident and
obtained insurance, driver's license and registration. (Tr. p. 129 L. 19- L. 25.) He learned that the
driver of the motorcycle involved in the crash possessed a weapon. Deputy Olson removed the
firearm and secured it in his police vehicle. (Tr. p. 131, Ls. 19-21.) Officer Olsen then observed the
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driver of the motorcycle speaking with the Mr Jackson. (Tr. p. 132 Ls. 13-14.) Mr. Jackson, in tum,
had owned and operated a towing service for over 52 years. Tr. p. 211 Ls. 3-9. He had received a
call about the possible need for towing/wrecker service so he went to the scene of the accident. (Tr.
p. 213, Ls. 3-6.) Mr. Jackson then began to speak with the driver of a motorcycle to determine ifhe
needed a wrecker service. (Tr. p. 213, L. 16-23.)
After securing the weapon, Officer Olson approached Mr. Jackson and overheard him say
something to the effect that Olson was from Idaho County and he was not sure why he was there.
He then heard Mr. Jackson say "asshole". Olson then engaged Mr. Jackson, telling him that he
needed to leave. (Tr. p. 134, Ls. 19-24.) Officer Hernandez then approached nearby. ( Tr. p. 135
L. 2.) Deputy Olson again told Mr. Jackson to leave and then placed Mr. Jackson under airest when

Mr. Jackson failed to do so. (Tr. p. 138 Ls. 11-12.)
Officers OIson and Hernandez both grab bed Mr Jackson and a struggle ensued as the officers
were forcing Mr. Jackson's arms behind his back and tried to force him to the ground. (Tr. p. 138
L. 14.)

During the struggle, the officers fractured Mr. Jackson's elbow and Officer Olson kneed

Mr. Jackson in the stomach or groin area. (Tr. p. 143, 1. 12-13; p. 217 Ls. 12-16)

During the

struggle, Officer Olson claimed he was struck in the ear by Mr. Jackson but was not sure if it was
with an open or closed hand. (Tr. p. 139 Ls. 18-22.)
Mr. Jackson was charged with Battery on an Officer, a felony, in violation of§ 18-915(3)(b)
and Resisting and Obstructing or Delaying an officer, a misdemeanor, in violation ofldaho Code §
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18-705. (R.P.25)

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the District Court Committed Reversible Enor by erroneously instructing the jury on the
elements of the crimes for which Mr. Jackson was charged?

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Committed Reversible Error by Providing Erroneous Jury
Instructions Regarding the Crime of Battery on an Officer Which Inaccurate
Instructions Prejudiced Mr. Jackson.

A. Standard of Review.
Whether a jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which the Court
exercises free review. When reviewing jury instructions, the Court asks whether the instruction
as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Garner,
159 Idaho 896,367 P.3d 720, 721 (2016). An enoneous instruction will not constitute reversible
e1Tor unless the instruction as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party. State v. Draper, 151
Idaho 576,588,261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011).

B.

The Court Improperly Instructed the Jury as to the State's Burden of Proof
for Felony Battery on an Officer.

The District Court improperly instructed the jury as to the conduct that could constitute
the crime of felony battery on an officer by including unlawful touching as described in section
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18-903(b). In doing so, the District Court reduced the State's burden of proof which constitutes
reversible effor. Draper, 151 Idaho at 588.
Mr. Jackson was charged with felony battery on an officer in violation of§ 18-915(3)(b)
which states, in states, in relevant part,
For committing a violation of the provisions of sections 18-903, Idaho Code,
except unlawful touching as described in section 18-903(b), Idaho Code,
against the person of a former or present peace officer, sheriff or police officer: (a)
Because of the exercise of official duty or because of the victim's former or
present official status; or (b) While the victim is engaged in the performance of
his duties and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should
know that such a victim is a peace officer, sheriff or police officer; the offense
shall be a felony ...
®. p. 25.) Despite the fact that the unlawful touching provision of 18-903(b) is expressly
excluded from the elements of felony battery on an officer, the District Comi included that
provision within its definition of battery. More particularly, Instruction No. 13 identified the
elements needed for the State to prove felony batte1y on an officer which included proof that the
"defendant THERRAL E. JACKSON committed a battery". ®. p. 101.) The Court then defined
battery by simply restating Idaho Code 18-903, including section 18-903(b). Instruction No. 14
provided as follow:
A "battery" is committed when a person:

(1) willfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the person of another; or
(2) actually, intentionally and unlawfully touches or strikes another person against
the will of the other; or
(3) unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily haim to an individual.
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®. p. 102.)

By including "unlawful touching" within the definition of battery, the District Court
instructed the jury that it could find Mr. Jackson guilty of battery on an officer based upon
conduct that Idaho Code Section 18-915(3)(b) specifically excluded from criminal culpability.
In doing so, the Court improperly expanded the type of conduct for which the Jmy could find the
defendant guilty.

A jmy instructions that lightens the prosecution's burden of proof and are

impermissible and an instructional error requires reversal of a judgment of conviction if the
instruction misled the jmy or prejudiced the defendant. State v. Halbesleben, 75 P.3d 219,223,
139 Idaho 165, 169 (Idaho App.,2003). Without question, the Cami's inclusion of the unlawful
touching provision of 18-903 (b) mislead the jury and prejudiced the defendant. As such, the
District Court committed reversible e1ror.
C.

The Court Failed to Instruct the Jury as to the Defendant's Right to Use
Force to Defend Himself If Law Enforcement Used Excessive Force.

Mr. Jackson was entitled to a self defense instruction which informed the jury that he
could use force if the officers Olson and Hernandez used excessive force against him. The
Court's failure to include such an instruction constitutes fundamental enor. In Idaho, a trial
judge must charge the jurors with all matters of law necessary for their information. A
defendant is entitled to have the jmy instructed on all points of the law applicable to a defense
themy that there was a justification or excuse for commission of the offense. State v. Spurr, 114
Idaho 277,279, 755 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Ct. App. 1988).
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In State v. Spurr, the defendant was found guilty of obstructing a police officer and
committing a battery upon a police officer. The Court, however, found that a person has a
constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive force by law enforcement officers in the
performance of their duties. As such, a defendant has the right to defend himself against the use
of excessive force by an officer. State v. Hartwig, 112 Idaho 370, 732 P.2d 339 (Ct. App. 1987).
The deteimination of whether excessive force has been used is a question of fact for the jury.

Spurr, 114 Idaho at 279.
In Spurr, the Comi held that the trial comi ened in failing to instruct the jury that if the
a1Testing officer used excessive force, Spun had a right to reasonably defend himself. Because
there was evidence from which the jury could have found that the arresting officer used force to
an excessive degree, the omission of that jury instruction was deemed reversible e1Tor. Id.
In the case at bar, there was clear evidence that the Officers used force during their anest
of Mr. Jackson which included kneeing him in the stomach or groin and using such force as to
fracture Mr. Jackson's elbow. Accordingly, the jmy should have been instructed that Mr.
Jackson had a right to use reasonable force to defend himself against the officers' use of
excessive force.
Compounding the problem with the failure to provide the self defense instruction was the
Court's inclusion of the instruction that informed the jury that a person has duty to refrain from
using force in resisting anest. More specifically, Instruction No. 19, specifically prohibited the
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use of force, stating that "If a person has reasonable ground to believe he is being a1Tested by a
peace officer, it is his duty to refrain from using force or any weapon in resisting arrest regardless
of whether o r not there is a legal basis for the arrest." R. P. 107
It is beyond fair debate that Mr. Jackson was prejudiced by the District Court's inclusion
oflnstruction No. 19 that prohibited the use of force while not including a self-defense
instruction that would have informed the jury that Mr. Jackson had a right to use force to defend
himself against excessive force. Accordingly, in reading the jury instructions as a whole, the
instructions constituted fundamental error as they prejudiced Mr. Jackson.

II.

Mr. Jackson's Due Process Was Violated as a Result of a Fatal Variance Between
the Jury Instructions and the Charging Document.

Mr. Jackson's due process rights were violated as a result of a fatal variance existing
between the charging language contained within the jury instruction and the actual charging
document for the crime of Resisting, Obstructing or Delaying an Officer.

Accordingly, the

Defendant's conviction should be vacated.
Jury instructions should match the allegations in the charging document as to the means
by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the charged crime." State v. Bernal, 164 Idaho
190,194,427 P.3d 1, 5 (2018) "Failure to do so creates a variance." Id. (citing State v. Folk, 151
Idaho 327,342,256 P.3d 735, 750 (2011) ). "A variance becomes fatal when it violates due
process." Id.

This Court discussed fatal variance in State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115,443 P3d 129
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(2019) wherein the Court stated that,
The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the
obvious requirements (1) that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the
charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense and not be
taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he may be
protected against another prosecution for the same offense.

Id. 443 P,3d at 134 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed.
1314 (1935))
Applying this standard presents a two-step process. State v. Gas, 161 Idaho 588, 592,
388 P.3d 912, 916 (Ct. App. 2016) ). First, the appellate court determines whether there was a
variance between the information used to charge the crime and the instruction presented to the
jury. Miller, 443 P .3d at 134. Second, if a variance does exist, then the court examines whether it
rises to the level of prejudicial e1rnr requiring reversal of the conviction, i.e., whether it is fatal.

Id. Even if there is a variance between the charging instrument and the jury instruction, reversal
is only necessary when the variance "deprives the defendant of the right to fair notice or leaves
him or her open to the risk of double jeopardy." Id. As to notice, this Comt must dete1mine
whether the defendant was misled or surprised "in the preparation or presentation of his or her
defense." Id., citing State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410,418, 716 P.2d 1182, 1190 (1985) ).
In State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327,342,256 P.3d, 735, 750 (2011) this Comt found a fatal
variance existed when a jury instruction permitted a jury to find the defendant guilty of crimes
not charged in the information. Folk, 151 Idaho at 342,256 P.3d at 750.
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A review of the criminal charge and the jury instruction in the case at bar clearly
establishes the existence of a variance. Within Count II, the Criminal Information specifically
identified the conduct that gave rise to the charge of Resisting and Obstructing. ( R. p. 26) More
particularly, Count II specifically stated that the charge was the result of Mr Jackson refusing to

"clear the scene of an ongoing investigation after having been requested to do so by Cpl. Keith
Olsen, Idaho County Sheriff's Office."®. p. 26) Jury Instruction 17, however, did not include
any of the specific conduct that was listed within the charging document.®. p. 105) Instead, it
provided as follows
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Resisting, Obstruction, or
Delaying an officer, the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or about the 12th June, 2018
2. In the state of Idaho
3. The defendant THERRAL E. JACKSON
4. Resisted, delayed, or obstructed
5. KEITH OLSEN, a peace officer,
6. In the discharge, or attempt to discharge, any duty of Keith Olsen's
office.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
( R. p. 105)
Here the charging document is far mor restrictive as to what conduct the state must prove
for the jury to find Mr. Jackson guilty of Obstruction than the jury instruction. This variance is
fatal because the jury instruction permitted a jmy to find the defendant guilty of Obstruction
based upon conduct other than failing to clear the scene when requested. Thus, it permitted a
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jmy to find Mr. Jackson guilty of Obstruction based upon conduct that had not been charged.
Like in Folk, this Court should find the existence of a fatal variance.
Without question, the enoneous instruction was prejudicial to the Defendant as it misstated
the law and significantly diminished the conduct that was needed for the jury to convict the
Defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Jackson respectfully request this Court to vacate the
convictions of felony batte1y on an officer and the misdemeanor charge of obstruction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17day of December 2019.

By:

4«
~//2/
JopatfunD.

Hally, a m;mber of the firm
1\ttomeys for Defendants/Appellants Jackson
/
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